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I call my lecture "reflections" on the separation ofchurch and state in part
because I have no strong assertions to make about it. Indeed, I will confess to
those here present that after two decades of laboring in the salubrious vineyards of
constitutional law, about half of that spent as what I suppose one would call a
specialist on religion, I continue to [md the concept of separation of church and
state baffling, utterly baffling. I do not mean by this admission to suggest that I am
an opponent of it; quite the contrary, I am fairly sure that I favor it. The problem is
that I have only the dimmest idea what the words mean, and therefore have but the
haziest notion of what it is that I favor; and I rather suspect that a fair number of
those who use the words, including some eminent jurists, share my confusion.
I suppose many people would describe the separation of church and state
as a mandate of the First Amendment; others would suggest that it is a
fundamental principle of liberal democracy; yet I can find no serious reason to
believe that either of these postulates is true; or, rather, if true, neither one is
sufficiently unambiguous to admit of serious dialogue. In other words, when we
use the phrase "separation of church and state," I suspect that few of us can really
guess what the other is talking about. And this has been true all through the
• Copyright 2002 by Stephen L. Carter. Professor Carter is the William Nelson
Cromwell Professor at Law at Yale; B.A., Stanford University; J.D., Yale. This lecture
was delivered by Professor Carter on Feb. 8, 2002, at the James E. Rogers College of Law,
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nation's history. Roger Williams and Thomas Jefferson, had they been
contemporaries, could have had an entirely incoherent conversation on the
doctrine, because they understood it so differently. One can stretch back earlier.
The Apostle Paul who wrote Romans 13 and Constantine the Great who absorbed
the organized Christian church into the Roman state could both have used the
phrase, too, but would have intended to convey sharply distinct ideas.
Let us consider the famously paradoxical words of Mr. Justice Black in
the Everson case, a little more than half a century ago:
The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.
That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve
the slightest breach.!
I should like to offer a respectful dissent, because I am skeptical of the proposition
that the separation of church and state is or could ever be a doctrine of
constitutional law. I fear that the image of the wall confuses more than it clarifies,
which is why Mr. Justice Stanley Reed was exactly right in objecting that it is not
proper to construct a rule of law from a figure of speech.2 But my discontent goes
deeper. The serious historian will readily admit that the metaphorical separation of
church and state, whatever precise meaning we might choose to assign to it today,
has its origins in Protestant theology, for it was the Protestants who laid before an
unenlightened Europe the model of the two great powers, the temporal and the
spiritual, and the theological argument for placing the capacities in the hands of
separate earthly masters.
It is vital that we in our legalist ahistoricism not forget that the Protestant
separatists believed in dividing church from state, not God from state. The
purpose of the separation was not to protect the state from religious believers but
to protect the church in its work of salvation from the corruption of the state. Both
earthly capacities were understood to fall under the rule of the one God, and,
indeed, the traditional Christian teaching on obedience to constituted authority
rests on this assumption. Thus, chapter 13 of the epistle of Paul to the Romans
begins:
Everyone must submit himselfto the governing authorities, for there
is no authority except that which God has established. The
authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently,
he who rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has
instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves.3
The key word, here translated "consequently," is in the original Greek rfJu.cc
meaning "so" in the sense of "in consequence." In other words, the reason the
1. Everson v. Board ofEducation, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
2. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Ed. ofSch. Dist No. 71, Champaign
County, Ill., 333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting).
3. Romans 13:1-2 (NIV).
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believer must obey the governirig authorities-and the only reason-is that they
were created by God.
The early Protestant theorists of church and state were inspired, as John
Noonan has lately reminded us, by the prophets of Israel, for it is in the often
lengthy biblical passages rehearsing the arguments between the rulers and the
prophets that we find what appear to be the first historical instances of outsiders
daring to accuse the sovereign ofacting against the will ofGod.4 Prior to that time,
as far as we can tell, rulers were themselves thought to be divine or semi-divine.
The idea that the king could do something contrary to the will of God denied the
monarch's divinity, and that denial carried within it the seeds of the separatist
revolution that would in time sweep the globe.
The Puritans certainly understood the problem, which was why they took
marriage away from the priests. In Protestant New England, it was actually against
the law for a member of the clergy to officiate at a wedding. The justice of the
peace, an individual with no clerical function, was required to perform the
ceremony. In this way, the Puritans "separated" the church from the state. But let
us be clear about their motive. In separating the two great powers, they were
seeking to purify the church, not the state. Their beloved church, they feared, was
at risk when it exercised authority over matters that the Bible did not command it
to run.s
These early American separationists-often called "pietistic" by the
historians-separated church and state for theological reasons. Yet, even as they
insisted that the two great powers remain rigorously demarcated, these pietistic
separationists never imagined that either power was to be separated from the
authority of the one true God: on the contrary, they saw divine edict as the source
ofthe sovereign's right to rule, and ofthe state's right to exist.
To be sure, other strands of separationism exist in American thought:
there were, for example, the Enlightenment separationists, who thought the state
would be better off were it separated from the church. But-without laboring the
point here-we probably overplay the differences. The Enlightenment thinkers did
not believe religion was dangerous, or that it was a pollutant in the pure waters of
politics. Rather, they worried about the danger that the church, ifmerged with the
state, would be tempted to coerce individuals into beliefs that the Bible required
them to accept voluntarily or not at all. Recent history had taught them this lesson,
although even the Inquisition, in a delightful burst oflegalese, took the view that it
was wrong to coerce men to act against their consciences but it was not wrong to
coerce their consciences.
4. See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1998).
5. For an excellent history of the desacrilization of marriage, see JOHN WITTE,
JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN
TRADmON (1997).
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In any event, I wish to talk about the pietists. I am interested, in
particular, in how we might enrich our understanding of the separation of church
and state by envisioning it as fIrst laid down, as a means to protect the church, not
the state. Although the lecture is intended as speculative, I will, I hope, have some
points to make about the way we might improve our constitutional law of religion
as well.
ll.
The separationist metaphor was popularized in the New World by Roger
Williams, the Baptist preacher (among other things) who founded Rhode Island,
fIrst as a refuge for those seeking religious freedom from Puritan Massachusetts,
although it later became the site of religious discriminations of its own. Williams
coined the metaphor of the garden and the wilderness to describe the relationship
between the church and the society it inhabited. For Williams, the garden was the
place of God's people, the community ofpeople offaith, who gathered together to
determine what the Lord required of them, nurturing and building their religious
understanding in relative tranquility. Outside the garden was the unevangelized
world, what Williams called the wilderness. And between the two, separating the
wilderness from the garden, was a high hedge wall, constructed to protect the
people of the garden in their work of religious nurture. The hedge wall existed to
keep the wilderness out, not to keep the people of the garden hemmed in. It was
the vital work of the garden, not the less vital work of the wilderness, that the wall
was built in order to protect.6 In other work, I have offered extended analyses of
Williams's metaphor.? For the moment, let it suffIce to say that the Supreme Court
was wrong, and has been consistently wrong, in attributing American authorship
of the idea ofa wall ofseparation to Thomas Jefferson rather than to Williams.
But even if Roger Williams, the seventeenth century Baptist, believed
that the wall of separation existed to protect the church from the state rather than
the other way around, is it not possible that the Enlightened eighteenth century
gentlemen who drafted the Constitution were worried more about the influence the
church might gain over the state?
Well, no.
In the fIrst place, the familiar contention that the Framers were dominated
by deists or other secularists rather than by traditional religious believers has not
stood up well to historical analysis.8 And, although it is commonly suggested that
6. For detailed discussion ofWilliams's metaphor of the wall of separation, see
TIMOTHY D. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WILLIAMS AND RELIGIOUS
LmERTY (1998); MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION
AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965).
7. See, for example, my discussion in STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN
VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLmcS ch. 5 (2000).
8. As a matter of fact, the dominant thinker in the training of those who met in
Philadelphia was probably John Calvin. For a persuasive recounting of Calvinist influence
on the Framers, see Marci A. Hamilton, The Calvinist Paradox ofDistrust and Hope at the
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the Framers sought to keep religion out of public life because they worried about
the sectarian warfare sweeping Europe, that suggestion, too, is on shaky historical
footing. The last arguably religious war on the European continent was the Thirty
Years War, which ended in the middle of the seventeenth century-well over a
hundred years before the drafting of the Constitution.9 After the end of the Thirty
Years War, Europe saw many others, motivated by nationalism, or commerce, or
aggrandizement. The Founders were wise enough to understand that it was people,
not religions, that made wars; and so their Constitution made it tougher for people
to get together to do mischievous things, whatever their motivations might have
been.
The notion that the Founding Generation was particularly afraid of the
influence of religion over the state is nonsense-pardonable nonsense, but
nonsense all the same. It does not stand up well to the evidence. Look at the
sermons by leading preachers who supported the Revolution. Charles Chauncy,
one of the most influential clergy in America in the late eighteenth century, argued
that separation from the Crown had become imperative precisely because the King
and Parliament were not "ruling in the fear of God." Argued Chauncy, after listing
the abuses of the Crown: "(I]t should be a constraining argument with rulers to be
just, that they are accountable to that Jesus, whom God hath ordained to be the
judge ofthe world, for the use of that power he has put into their hands."10 Indeed,
if anyone in the turbulent colonial debate of the era argued against religious
influence over affairs of state, it was the supporters of the Crown, who were fond
of reminding the revolutionaries, in the words of the famed Tory preacher
Jonathan Boucher, that "obedience to government is every man's duty because it
is in every man's interest; but it is particularly incumbent on Christians,
because...it is enjoined by the positive commands of God."u The insurrectionists
were unpersuaded. In 1783, a pro-revolution pampWeteer put the answer simply:
"But all kings are limited, and the connexion may be thus confirmed in short: That
power which is not the ordinance ofGod, may be resisted."12
This is not to say that all or even most colonial clergy supported the break
with England. At the moment of revolution, every Southern state had an
Constitutional Convention, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 293 (Michael
W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001).
9. Ifanyone should have been influenced by religious warfare in Europe, it was
Williams, as indeed he was; his solution was not to keep religious influences out of
government but vice versa.
10. Charles Chauncy, Civil Magistrates Must Be Just, Ruling in the Fear ofGod,
Sermon preached on May 27, 1747, before the House of Representatives of Massachusetts
Bay, reprinted in POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805, at 139, 165 (Ellis
Sandoz ed., 1991).
11. Jonathan Boucher, quoted in BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 315 (enlarged ed. 1992).
12. Anonymous, probably Stephen Case, Defensive Arms Vindicated and the
Lawfulness ofthe American War Made Manifest [1783], reprinted in POLITICAL SERMONS
OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805 at 713, 738.(Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991).
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established Anglican church, and, as the historian William Lee Miller has pointed
out, "an Anglican clergyman took an oath to support the king, the supreme head of
the church, as part of his ordination.")3 As the war neared, most of the clergy
evidently did as the oath prescribed.
Yet that is not the point of the story. The point is that the clergy took
sides in the war, and that both parties wanted them to. Far from fearing the
incursion of the religious voice into politics, even on the most vital issues of the
day, the Founding Generation welcomed it. As a matter offact, they relied on it.
ill.
This history is only prologue. I do not mean to suggest that an account of
past controversy creates in us a binding obligation to the political science of an
earlier generation. I believe, ofcourse, that we owe to traditions prior to our own a
healthy degree of respect, and even deference, and, certainly, that we should not
view them through the eyes of ahistorical critique. But we may have better ideas.
Let us investigate whether that is true.
If the separation of church and state is a rule of constitutional law, then it
must emerge, through a process of interpretation, from the Constitution itself, and
must then admit of workable defInition. The Supreme Court has identifIed the
First Amendment as the source of the metaphor, locating it, in particular, in what
nearly everybody calls the Establishment Clause.
I put the point that way because the text of the First Amendment, on its
face, does not admit of the two-religion-clause interpretation. Let us simply look at
the language, elegant and gracious ifperhaps needlessly involute:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;...
The First Amendment is made up of a series of three clauses, separated
by semi-colons. We have, thus, the religion clause, the speech and press clause,
and the assembly and petition clause.
The religion clause is the fIrst to which we come when we read over the
amendment. The religion clause on its face appears to address a single subject.
The two-clause reading given it by all courts and most commentators is not the
one that emerges most readily from the text. After all, if the clause is meant to be
in two segments, each referring substantively to a different area of constitutional
law, why on earth does it end with the word "thereof'? The minimum we must
grant to the authors is that this fInal tantalizing word, "thereof," must refer to the
word "religion," as in the phrase "establishment of religion," which suggests-one
might even say requires-that the word be given the same defInition in both parts
of the clause. That is, even if we grant the shaky proposition that the religion
13. WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LmERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
REpUBLIC 16 (1986).
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clause is actually two clauses, there is no plausible interpretation on which the
word "religion," mentioned once and then marked with a pregnant "thereof," can
mean two different thingS.14
Why does this matter? It matters because the tendency of courts and
commentators has been to give a very narrow reading ofthe word religion in what
we are bold to label the "Establishment Clause," and a much broader reading in
what we insist on calling the "Free Exercise Clause." Contrary to the evident
structure of the text, we use the word religion to refer to two very different things.
For example, the word religion in the "Free Exercise Clause" (remember that the
real word is thereof) is generally conceded to include non-religion: atheism, say, is
protected as part of the freedom of religion. In the case of the previous occurrence
of the word religion, however-its use in the the "Establishment Clause"-we do
not include atheism.
Very well. How is all of this semantic inquiry related to the problem of
the separation of church and state? At the outset of this lecture, you will recall, I
expressed doubt on the proposition that the separation of church and state is, or
can be transformed into, a doctrine of substantive constitutional law. But let us
assume, contra my skepticism, that it can. What is its source? Where in the
document do we find the text to which we will attach it?
Let us look back at the "Establishment Clause," as it is called. There,
after all, is the provision in which the separationist metaphor is located by its most
ardent constitutional advocates. But what a peculiar place the clause turns out to
be! "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." Let us
be realistic. Surely the clause means what it says, and no more than that. At the
moment of the founding, the majority of the states had official, state-supported,
established churches, and all but two required religious tests for public office. The
states were not giving these powers away. On the contrary, they wanted to protect
their own established churches from interference by the new national government,
and also wanted to prevent that national government from establishing a church of
its own. My Yale colleague Akhil Reed Amar has argued persuasively that we
should therefore read the ''Establishment Clause" as a states'-rights provision, as
an allocation between the national and local sovereignties of the authority to create
or to endorse an official church. IS
If Professor Amar is right, then the Supreme Court's subsequent
proclamation that the clause is "incorporated" against the states through the
agency ofthe Fourteenth Amendment begins to lose its luster, to say nothing of its
coherence. If the purpose of the ''Establishment Clause" was to keep the national
14. For a rather jocular attention to the same point, see NOONAN, supra note 4, at
357. An important early attempt to set out two separate definitions of the term "religion" in
the clause is found in William Van Alstyne, Constitutional Separation ofChurch and State:
The Questfor a Coherent Position, 57 AM. POLmCAL SCI. REv. 865 (1963).
15. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTs: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 32-45 (1998).
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government from interfering in what was properly a local responsibility, the only
sensible meaning of incorporation would be that it now prevents the state
government from interfering with local communities as they decide whether to
establish their own churches. fu other words, if the clause is truly to be applied
against the states, then the state of Arizona would not be able to prevent Tucson
from establishing an official church, and the state of Connecticut would not be able
to prevent New Haven from reviving the old established Congregational Church as
its formal public faith.
I am not suggesting that this is a desirable result. I mention it only
because I think it quite wrong historically, and quite unpersuasive textually, to look
to the "Establishment Clause" as the source of a prohibition on creation of these
things called "establishments," which leads in turn to the long line ofunfathomable
federal court cases telling us which government programs amount to forbidden
"establishments" and which do not. Without that line of cases, however, we have
no wall of separation; or none, at least, located in the first half of the first clause of
the First Amendment.
IV.
So if the wall of separation is to be constructed on a foundation of the
constitutional text, perhaps we might find its support in the second half of the first
clause of the First Amendment, that is, the so-called "Free Exercise Clause."
There, at least, the case is more plausible, assuming always what I have already
told you I doubt, that metaphors make good rules of law, constitutional or
otherwise.
. I am hardly the first to suggest that the separation of church and state is
better understood as a means for protecting religious liberty than as a way of
preventing forbidden religious establishments. As a matter of fact, much of the
serious theory of the religion clause in recent years points in that direction.16 Yet,
as I continue along this speculative path of reasoning, I hope to reach the same
end-the proper location and thus the proper understanding of the separation of
church and state-by a slightly different route than the one scholars have tended to
follow.
Let us consider, first, one of the great constitutional rulings of the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court's 1943 decision in West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette. l ? There the Justices ruled that objecting children whose
parents were Jehovah's Witnesses could not be compelled, contrary to the dictates
of their faith, to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. The case is nominally about free
speech, and often cited as an early example of the protection of religious liberty,
16. See JOHN WIITE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (2000), which is among the best of the
recent works proposing to locate the separation of church and state in the words "free
exercise thereo£"
17. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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but what is most remarkable is the breadth of Justice Jackson's language for the
Court:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to
US. IS
According to Justice Jackson, it is the prescription-the compulsory
recital of a creed-that leads to the constitutional problem. The difficulty, in other
words, is not that the state likes the Pledge ofAllegiance and is willing to make its
preferences clear; the difficulty is that the dissenters are coerced into acting as
though they agree, and punished if they do not.
This, surely, is what the separation of church and state is (or should be)
most keenly about. The high hedge wall protects the garden from the wilderness
precisely in order to allow the people of the garden to nurture the faith without the
interference of the state. And one can imagine few more intrusive state acts than
requiring that the people of the garden recite an official creed that is inconsistent
with what their religion teaches.
Yet the point is deeper. Recall once more that Barnette involved children.
A little less than two decades earlier, in Pierce v. Society ofSisters,19 the Court had
affirmed what most Americans of the day doubtless took as received wisdom, that
decisions about the education of children must be left in the hands of the parents,
as part of the parents' liberty. In Pierce, the state of Oregon had adopted by
referendum a provision outlawing most private schools. The Court ruled the law
unconstitutional, as an infringement on the rights of parents, who must be free to
choose private education, including religious education, for their children.
What has all this to do with separationism? Just this: Barnette is justly
celebrated as a judicial recognition of the primacy of individual conscience. What
Pierce adds to the mix is a celebration of the places where conscience is formed.
Indeed, it is a striking weakness of contemporary liberal theory that so much
attention is paid to protecting the individual in the exercise of the convictions he
may possess, but so little is paid to how he comes to possess them. The separation
of church and state, as understood by Williams, would propose that the principal
place in which conscience is formed is the delicate space of the garden. The wall
of separation must protect that space from state interference.
It has become a commonplace of liberal theory to argue for the
importance of educating the young in the faculty of critical rationality, so that, as
they grow, they may choose for themselves which convictions to adopt. Some
theorists today would prefer a somewhat thicker liberalism, in which basic tenets
18. Id. at 642.
19. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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of liberal thought-tolerance seems to top most lists2°-would be taught. There is
a surface attractiveness to both these ideas, for it is terribly tempting, once one
knows the great truths, to reach out and seize the institutions of the state in order
to inculcate those truths in the young, and thus to make the political sphere safe
for generations to come. Tempting, yes-but also dangerous, and not different in
kind from the idea that we ought to have classroom prayer because the students
who pray will be better off for having done so. Organized classroom prayer, too,
tends to break down the wall of separation, not because it is an "establishment" of
religion (which it isn't) but because it represents a profound interference with the
freedom of the family to create for its children the garden it prefers.21 Teaching
tolerance, teaching prayer: Each argument begins with the same error; each ends
with the same mischief.
The mischief is coercion. But let us be clear where the coercion problem
lies. The parents are always free to coerce their children: You must go to school.
You must do your homework. You must go to the party. The school, moreover, is
always free to coerce the children in the parents' name: You must serve your
detention. The coercion that brings the problem, then, is not of the student qua
student; it is of the student as a representative of the family. It is the religious
liberty of the family that matters, the liberty to decide for itself on the particular
moral world-the garden-that it wants the children to inherit. If the garden is the
sphere in which conscience is nurtured, parents are the nurturers who stand watch
on the high hedge wall. And it may be that the particular wilderness against which
they wish to build walls is the very wilderness the state wants the children to
inhabit.
Thus the separation of church and state, as guardian of religious liberty,
means that the school should not be permitted to force the children to adhere to a
creed contrary to the moral or religious teaching of the family. If the state uses its
schools as a tool to wean the children away from the parents' religion-as many
states tried actively to do at the height of anti-Catholic nativism in the nineteenth
centtlI"y22-the state is breaching the wall. So far, courts have for the most part
overlooked their duty to protect the garden that the parents try to build. But it is
time for a change. If we protect the nurturing in the garden of values and ideas
20. My critical faculties tell me that the concept of tolerance is empty, but
perhaps they have been poorly trained. For an explanation of my view on this point, see
STEPHEN L. CARTER, CIVILITY: MANNERS, MORALS, AND THE ETIQUETIE OF DEMOCRACY
213-23 (1998).
21. The original classroom prayer cases are Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962), and Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
22. For accounts of the nativist efforts to use the public schools to wean Roman
Catholic children in particular from the faith of their parents, see JAY P. DOLAN, THE
AMERICAN CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT
(1985); WARREN A. NORD, RELIGION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION: RETHIN~G ANATIONAL
DILEMMA (1995). For my own discussion of some of this history, see STEPHEN L. CARTER,
THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAW, RELIGION, AND LOYALTY lee. 1
(2000).
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very different from the mainstream, we will create a steady supply ofchallenges to
the status quo, of radical dissenters who might lead us in new directions, of fools
and knaves, certainly, but ofmartyrs in just causes, too. The civil rights movement
and the abolition movement were church-led revolutions, and they were
accomplished because the garden was largely left alone: raised to ideas radically
different from the wisdom of the moment, the leaders of those movements, as well
as the rank-and-file, put their faith into practice and changed the nation.
Religions have always been characterized by the attempt to project
themselves into the future. Indeed, some have argued that a religion should not
qualify for the name until it has managed to survive over several generations.
Anyone can have a belief about God; but it takes the nurturing of the belief over
time to transform it into a religion. Many religions take the view that it is a
requirement of the faith that the children be trained in it. Christianity, my own
tradition, carries a strong norm, and perhaps a duty, of teaching the young. Indeed,
there is every reason to think that the religious training of the young was of first
importance in Christian families from earliest times. The norm is reflected, for
example, in Paul's second letter to Timothy.23 It is also part of the Hebrew
Scriptures, the Christian Old Testament, which served as a principal source of
instruction for first-century Christians.24 In fIrst-century Rome, the obligation of
Christian parents to raise their children in the faith grew increasingly explicit and
absolute.2S
To believe in true religious liberty, one must accept a broad ability of the
people of the garden to pass on their faith to their children. The fact that the state
might think it has a better idea than the people of the garden do (today, critical
rationality and tolerance; a century and a half ago, Americanism) is actually a
rather meager justifIcation for breaching the wall. And, as to the claim, commonly
pressed, that the school curriculum will not interfere with religion as properly
understood-well, the dissenters in the garden, struggling to raise their children,
are entitled to their improper understanding. If the state is free to breach the wall
simply because it has better ideas, then one supposes that the people of the garden
must try to protect themselves by getting their hands on those same levers; after
all, they, too, believe that they possess better ideas.
23. CJ. 2 Timothy 1:5 (NIV): "I have been reminded ofyour sincere faith, which
first lived in your grandmother Lois and in your mother Eunice and, 1 am persuaded, now
lives in you also."
24. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 4:9; Deuteronomy 6:7; Psalm 78:5; Proverbs 22:6.
25. See James S. Jeffers, Jewish and Christian Families in First-Century Rome,
in JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY IN FIRST-CENTURY ROME 128 (Karl P. Donfried & Peter
Richardson, eds., 1998). According to Jeffers, the principal source ofmoral teaching in the
early Christian family, following the Roman model, was probably the mother. (For a
refutation of the common argument that first-century Christianity was not really a religion
but merely a philosophy of life, see WAYNE A. MEEKS, THE FIRST URBAN CHRISTIANS: THE
SOCIAL WORLD OF THE APOSTLE PAUL ch. 5 (1983).)
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The wall of separation of church and state was developed to prevent this
competition. If the garden is protected by the hedge wall, then the mere fact that a
powerful group of outsiders believes its own ideas to be more important to the
education of children than the ideas of the parents and their religious communities
is not a sufficient reason to supersede the family's authority to build its moral
world. Otherwise, Barnette is simply wrong. If the high hedge wall does not
prevent state interference as children are raised in the garden, then there is no
reason for the courts to get involved if the state chooses to coerce adherence to the
nationalist creed contained in the Pledge of Allegiance. That the case happens to
involve the Pledge rather than a critical thinking curriculum-or the theory of
evolution26-should be considered an accident of history, not the basis for the
decision.
v.
But now the reflection has brought us face-to-face with an interesting
problem. It is easy, as we have seen, to understand how an enriched appreciation
of religious liberty would handle the classroom prayer cases. The question is
whether it should matter that the prayers in question are noticeably religious. The
Pledge of Allegiance, by way of distinction, is not. Lest one point to the language
"under God" as evidence of religiosity, it is useful to bear in mind that in 1943,
when Barnette was decided, those words were not yet part of the text. They were
added later, in the early years of the Cold War, to distinguish the United States
from what used to be called "Godless communism.,,27 Consequently, if we
consider the Barnette case (as I am speculating that we should) as an exemplar of
judicial protection of the sphere in which conscience is nurtured, we cannot make
the contours of that sphere depend upon whether the recitation that is coerced
happens to be religious. It is the coercion, not its religiousness, that the separation
of church and state forbids.
Consider once more the experience of the early Christians. Pliny, who
persecuted Christians early in the second century, may have been the first Roman
official to come up with the idea of requiring suspects to disprove their
Christianity by indulging in ritual acts honoring the emperor or the Roman gods.
Anyone who refused to perform the rituals was summarily executed.28
26. As far as I am aware, this analogy, now a commonplace of argument in this
arena, was first presented by the attorney Wendell Bird in his student law review note. See
Wendell Bird, Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public Schools, 87
YALEL.J. 515 (1978).
27. See GARRY WILLS, UNDER GOO: RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 81
(1990).
28. See ROBERT L. WILKEN, THE CHRISTIANS AS THE ROMANS SAW THEM 8-30
(1984). Pliny, interestingly, believed that Christians were atheists, as did many Roman
observers, perhaps because they were monotheistic, or perhaps because they believed that
God had become incarnate as a human being, and therefore, in pagan eyes, were
worshipping a man.
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Why would the Christian refuse to perform the rituals? Plainly, because
he believed that God had so commanded. Pliny, then, was executing Christians for
following what they believed to be divine will. But nothing in this account turns
on the undeniable fact that the rituals Pliny chose were religious. The problem for
the believing Christian was not that Pliny demanded worship of the Roman gods,
but that he demanded what God forbade them to do. Thus, had Pliny stumbled
upon one of the many early Christian sects pledged to celibacy and required them,
on pain of execution, to engage in sexual activity, the problem for the believer
would have been identical.
The Christian position on such matters has changed little in the ensuing
centuries. The Christian tradition, even though it counsels obedience to properly
constituted state authorities, nevertheless places obedience to God above
obedience to the will of the state. Yet the tradition teaches that the authority of the
state to rule is given by God. The two propositions do not erupt in paradox
because they are mediated by a corollary: if the state consistently commands what
God forbids, or forbids what God commands, then perhaps it is not, after all,
constituted by God, and therefore is not the state and need not be obeyed.
This corollary was crucial during the middle of the nineteenth century in
the argument over slavery. Southern pastors argued that slavery, right or wrong,
was the law of the land, and that Christians therefore were required to make their
peace with it. It was left to the abolitionist preachers to raise the objection that a
state that would countenance the enslavement of human beings risked sacrificing
its God-given authority to rule.29 Indeed, a principal theme of abolitionist
preaching, from radicals and moderates alike, was that the Christian's first duty
was to serve God-to follow what the pastors called the "Higher Law"-even
when the laws of the state were different. Thus, for example, active disobedience
to the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was held justified because the requirement to
return escapees conflicted with God's law. Typical ofthe anti-slavery position was
one articulated by Ichabod Spencer, a Presbyterian pastor, who argued that
although Christians have a religious duty to obey the government, that duty ceases
when the state becomes "so unjust, oppressive, tyrannical, and cruel, as not to
answer the designed, and righteous, and beneficial purposes of government for a
whole people." When the state falls to that level, said Spencer, it "deserves no
respect as an ordinance of God, for it is then acting contrary to the will ofGod and
the necessity ofsociety.,,30
Abolitionist preaching was full of similar argumentation, all of it resting
on the same simple truth as the separation of church and state itself: that the state
can be wrong, and the believer may consult the will of God to understand when
this is so. Were church and state not separated, the contention that the state is
29. I discuss this history in greater detail in STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN
VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS ch. 6 (2000).
30. ICHABOD S. SPENCER, THE RELIGIOUS DUTY OF OBEDIENCE TO LAW: SERMON
PREACHED IN THE SECOND PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH 14 (1850).
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wrong for God's reasons would be difficult if not impossible to articulate, as the
state might therefore claim to speak for God. Even Kant understood this point, and
addressed it at some length in his essay "Religion within the Bounds of Mere
Reason." According to Kant, the idea of divinely inspired Scripture implies that
the text holds a message, and that implication in turn suggests the need for a
trained interpreter to work out what the message is. The interpreter must be guided
by his reason, applied in a way that is consistent with the teaching of the faith.
Thus, Kant argued, from the point of view of religious faith, the state cannot be
allowed to enact dogma and creeds, because the state is the voice of the people,
the laity; and official enactment of a creed would amount to the laity telling the
clergy what the Scriptures meant-exactly the reverse of what revealed religion
requires.31
But the space in which the clergy will explain Scripture to the laity must
therefore be protected absolutely from interference by the state. And it is the same
sphere-the same garden-which we have already been pondering. The people of
the garden (or, rather, the many gardens) must be free to teach the young that
obedience to God is a higher value than obedience to the state; and that the state is
wrong when it enacts laws requiring what God forbids. If the state is allowed to
use its schools, or other tools, to shape the young contrary to the designs of the
garden, this freedom is infringed, and radical argumentation of the sort featured in
abolitionist preaching becomes impossible.32
The Justices briefly recognized the need for protection so broad in the
controversial 1972 decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder,33 which allowed the Old Order
Amish to keep their children home from school after eighth grade. To require the
children to attend further, the Court implied, would devastate the Amish religion.
31. IMMANuEL KANT, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, in
RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS 118-122 (Allen
Wood & George di Giovanni trans., 1998). Kant did not leave to the experts the entire field.
He thought their interpretations of Scripture should be freely criticized by the laity, as a
way of encouraging dialogue, and that the clergy should listen to the arguments of the
unschooled. But he opposed the notion of laws telling the churches, or their clergy, which
interpretations were correct, or which were to be taught.
32. This proposition might reasonably raise in the reader's mind the question of
vouchers and other forms of public support for religious education. After all, if the state
must avoid interference with the garden, has the state an obligation to pay for it? The
answer, I think, is no: the state has no obligation of support. But the state is not prohibited
from supporting either, and, to the extent that the cases suggest otherwise, the cases would
seem to be permitting, even requiring, what looks like a patent violation of the separation of
church and state. If the state can support private education at all, it surely must include
religious education; otherwise, it is, in effect, taxing the parents whose visions ofthe garden
are furthest from the mainstream. I hasten to add that I am not at all sure about the wisdom
of accepting state money for religious education, should it become available, because state
influence will likely follow state dollars. But the question ofwhether the benefits outweigh
the risks is for each religious group prayerfully to resolve in its own way. It is not a
question ofconstitutional moment.
33. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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Scores of commentators, led by Justice Douglas in a stinging dissent, have
excoriated the Yoder result. But if, as I have speculated so far, the separation of
church and state exists to protect religious liberty, it is difficult to see how the case
could have been decided the other way.
VI.
In my rush to speculate about matters not often associated with religious
liberty, I have so far neglected a variety of questions that plainly belong in the
conversation. The Supreme Court, after all, has supplied us with a voluminous
jurisprudence on a way of approaching religious liberty, and if much of the law is
quite bad, it is at least possessed of the virtue of consistency. And what is most
interesting about our bad constitutional law of religious liberty is where the Court
has made its error. For the stumbling block, in nearly every case, is at the same
precise point: the fruitless effort to pour content into the "free exercise clause"
without violating the "establishment clause." Because the Justices seem to see the
two parts of the religion clause as being at war with each other, it is inevitable that
the law the Court produces will be in key respects mistaken.34
The mistaken idea that the First Amendment protects some important
value other than states rights through its ban on establishments had led the Court,
and not a few of the commentators, to worry about giving too much to believers
who seek to invoke the clause's protection for their free exercise of religion. The
problem is this: if a group of believers, as will surely occur, seeks exemption from
genemlly applicable laws on the ground that the group's religion will not allow
them to comply, a grant of a special privilege to ignore the law-what the courts
call an accommodation-would seem, on its face, a special favor. Because the
Court has decided that the First Amendment prohibits, through the "establishment
clause," special favors for religious groups, the protection sought is, unfortunately,
not the Court's to grant. This line of reasoning has led to a long line of rather
shaky decisions, in which, to put the matter simply, the Justices have pointed
religious dissenters to politics to seek protection from generally applicable
laws3s-even though if a political solution were likely, judicial sanctuary would
not have been sought in the first place; and, besides, one who is concerned about
"establishments" might worry that, however bad judicial creation of
accommodations might be, legislative creation is still worse.36
34. lowe this proposition to Michael McConnell, who has articulated it often,
perhaps most usefully in Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1109 (1990). Another very thoughtful discussion of the
problem may be found in Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Power and the Restoration of
Federalism, 574 ANNALS 52 (2001).
35. See, e.g., Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); O'Lone v. Estate
ofShabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
36. A particularly effective exponent of this view has been Professor Ira C.
Lupu. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious
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If the wall of separation is conceptualized in the way I have suggested, as
a metaphor for keeping the state's nose out of the affairs of the church rather than
the other way around, it is plain that some level of accommodation will be
necessary. In no other way can we truly nurture the diverse gardens our
democracy needs and the First Amendment demands. So, for example, when a
woman hired by the attorney general of Georgia had her job offer yanked away
because she had married another woman in a religious ceremony, contrary to the
public policy of the state, one need have no particular view of same-sex marriage,
or even on gay rights, to see that the state has crossed the wall of separation: for
what goes on within the four walls of the house of worship is, absent some sort of
life-threatening emergency, simply 'not the state's business.37 Similarly, when a
preacher decides, for better or worse, that the time has come to endorse a political
candidate from the pulpit, the Internal Revenue Service should launch no
investigation into the tax-deductible status of the church in question, because,
again, the state that believes in the wall of separation must take no account
whatever ofwords spoken by the clergy within the performance of their duties.38
Does all this speculation seem to give an awful lot of special rights to
religionists? Of course it does. But if we do not want to grant those rights, we
surely should stop talking about the separation of church and state. If we treat
religion like everything else, we are not separating church and state, we are
combining them, by reducing the sphere of religion to one far smaller than the
authors of the metaphor imagined. Indeed, if we do not want to honor religious
liberty by providing the litigative tools for religionists to use to protect the moral
worlds they wish to build, we should cease any pretense that we believe in
separating church and state; for in that case, what we really want is for the state to
knock down the wall and win the day.
VIT.
In our enthusiasm for the anti-establishment side of the separation of
church and state-the side that neither has nor can have any coherent doctrine
behind it-we tend to neglect the pro-religious liberty side, the real concern of the
pioneers of the metaphor. I think that is probably why we guard free exercise so
poorly. We choose to place the energy of radical judicial intervention on the side
of limiting government speech; whereas the greatest threats to liberty lie not in the
government's speech but in its action. The posting of the Ten Commandments on
the wall of a courtroom might be, for many Americans, offensive; but not allowing
Liberty, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 565 (1999); Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 743 (1992); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause:
The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555
(1991).
37. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997).
38. I discuss in more detail the proposition that the tax status of churches should
not be affected by their political activities in CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN, supra note 29,
at ch. 5.
HeinOnline -- 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 309 2002
2002] REFLECTIONS 309
See C. H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000).
See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753
a grade school student in New Jersey to read his favorite story to the class, merely
because the story comes from the Bible, is an offense to religious liberty.39 The
cross that the Ku Klux Klan erected in Capitol Square in Columbus, Ohio, might,
for many of the citizens, be a reminder of what they hated or feared;40 but, if a
school can coerce students into reciting as true what the faith of their fathers
believes to be false, the state becomes, for those parents, a hated and feared source
ofreligious oppression.
How, then, to resolve our establishment dilemmas? We might be far
better off it we tried to find answers in politics. The Supreme Court, to its credit,
did much of the spadework forty years ago when it banned organized classroom
prayer led by a teacher. The Justices created a conversational climate in which it is
possible-if we are interested-to discuss exactly what is wrong with the
observances that had been part of the school day for a century and a half before
Engel and Abington, and perhaps to find a rule of reason, based somewhere in the
need to compromise that lies at the heart of democx:acy at its best.41 Surely finding
compromises would be a better solution than the endless partisan posturing by
ideologues of the left and right, which leads to the endless stream of litigation, and
the endless supply of ever-more-confusing court decisions that purport to tell us
what counts, and what does not, as an establishment ofreligion.
On the free exercise side of the ledger, on the other hand, we would do
well to fmd greater judicial scrutiny, not less. We cannot protect religious
liberty-the only concern of the authors of the religion clause-if we do not
protect the places where religious belief is nurtured. And that should be the
primary work of the courts under the religion clause. Alas, as we have seen, it is
work at which the courts have failed badly.
Instead, the law tries to reduce religion in scope, making it just like
everything else. If religion is just a form of speech or belief, then it is unjust to
reserve for religious speakers or believers privileges not granted to other speakers
or believers. But the fact that the religion clause is included in the First
Amendment suggests that, at least to the Founders, religion was not a species of
the other important aspects of conscience that the Amendment was written to




41. I am not suggesting that the absolutism of Abington and Engel well serves
the cause of separationism-at least as they have been read by later interpreters. I quite see
how organized classroom prayer infringes on the constitutionally protected ability of the
family to create a moral world for children. Whether the infringement is greater than in the
case of, say, the Pledge of Allegiance-or the theory of evolution-is not so easy to
resolve. Yet, on the argument I have presented, the violation would have to be so much
worse as to constitute a difference in kind not merely degree. Otherwise, one cannot support
the conclusion that the classroom prayer violation is resolved by a ban on the practice,
whereas the evolution or Allegiance violations are resolved by excusing the student from
performing the ritual invocation ofa creed.
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comparisons. The judge who seeks a defInition, even for the purpose of enforcing
the First Amendment's protections, has already proposed to reduce religion to a
merely human scale. Kierkegaard was surely right: when we make of our faith a
thing to be defended, we also shrink it to a defensible size, and thus remove a part
ofits power.
Ninety years ago, a Philadelphia pastor put the point this way in a sermon
on what one might call the priority ofrighteousness:
The time has come for a protest. Religion is the fountain-
head of the ideal. It is the impulse that leads men to do good,
'hoping for nothing.' It fmds its compensation in the absorbing
power ofa disciple's love. The moment we try to make it a figurable
quantity, we lose it. Can faith and penitence be put in parallel
columns? Can a price be fixed to mercy, or a cost-mark be tied to
the truth? Of all the things in life that come to us on their own
recommendation, the values ofreligion are the first. They are lost by
the man, or the age, that has 'no vision.' Reason cannot estimate
them. They must be received without thought of the cost of
entertainment, or they depart. While we are scrutinizing them from
an upper window, or trying to unfasten some rusty lock of
calculation, they are gone.
Religion must refuse to surrender to the pragmatic and
commercial spirit ofour age. She must assert her kingship. She must
not march behind the chariot ofa conquering materialism....42
Which leads us back, in the end, to the paradox. The world points religion in a
particular direction, and sometimes, in craven surrender, religion marches
according to the world's command. When, instead, religion chooses the path of
righteousness, marching according to God's command, the world rises up in-.-
consternation, and condemnation. At the same time, religion is, often, consternated
by the world, and condemns it right back.
Properly understood, the separation of church and state prohibits the state
from favoring one condemnation over the other. But, as we have seen,
separationism so understood carries internal contradictions incapable of logical
resolution. So we resort instead to power. The winner in the contest over meaning,
a contest not yet ended, is not the side that is possessed ofthe answer that is "best"
but the side that is possessed of better control over the institutions that set the
rules. The courts are one battleground, but, as we have seen, the schools are
another. And there are more.
The war to defme the meaning of separationism continues apace, with
both sides sharpening their rhetoric, and neither showing any sign of backing
down, or, indeed, of a serious interest in compromise. So we battle on, two
42. George Hooper Ferris, D.D., Compensation: Sermon at the First Baptist
Church Philadelphia, 7 (Feb. 25, 1912) (on file with Author).
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nations, mutually unintelligible, each deeply suspicious of the other, and each one
rightly certain that the other is trying to manipulate the rules of the game. I see no
solution, and, indeed, no end; perhaps we democrats (small d) must learn to live
with the tension. But let us remember what Camus wrote of Sisyphus: The
struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart.
The Supreme Court, just a few days before this talk was delivered, heard
oral argument in another case involving the Jehovah's Witnesses. This time, the
town of Stratton, Ohio, has adopted an ordinance requiring a permit for all door-
to-door soliciting, in the interest of the safety of the residents, most of whom are
evidently elderly.43 By the time this lecture is published, the case will have been
decided. I cannot predict what the result will be. I can tell you what I think the
result should be, if we truly believe in separation of church and state, and,
depending on the actual outcome, what I have to say will read either as an
explanation for the Court's decision or a dissent from it.
Simply put, I think the town of Stratton should lose. The power of the
state should not be used to shut down religious solicitation. We can all stipulate
that the risk to personal safety, even in the home, is a grim reality in this broken
and sinful world. In the terms in which we have been talking this morning,
however, the crucial question is not whether the fears for safety are rational, but
whether they justifY regulation of the people of one particular garden as they filter
out into the wilderness. Here we speak not of the effort to seize the levers of
power, but simply of the desire to witness, to share with others the story that has
moved them. In the image painted for us by Roger Williams, the people of the
garden enjoy not merely the right but the solemn duty to cross the high hedge wall
and spread the word to others.
I began these remarks as a reflection. I explained at the beginning that I
bring to the task of interpreting the metaphor of separation of church and state far
less certainty than I would prefer, especially after studying the subject for so many
years. Yet it does seem to me that our constitutional law of religion is dead wrong
on three counts:
1) Despite what courts and commentators say, the First
Amendment contains only one religion clause, not two, and the
text will not admit of an interpretation that tries to assign two
different meanings to the word religion, which appears only
once.
2) The separation of church and state, if it is to be a rule of
constitutional law at all, should be understood as a tool for
furthering religious liberty, not hampering it, for the wall
protects the garden, not the wilderness.
43. See Watchtower Bible and Tract Society ofNew York v. Village of Stratton,
No. 00-1737 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2001). The Court heard oral argument on February 26,2002.
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3) The liberty that must be protected is not simply the liberty of
conscience, but the liberty of those fragile spaces in which
conscience is nurtured. If the wall turns out not to guard the
people of the garden in their work, then the wall does no service
to the cause in which the metaphor was invented.
And what else might all of this mean in practice? Again, consider the
case before the Supreme Court that I mentioned a moment ago, a case that will
surely have been resolved by the time these remarks (delivered in February 2002)
are published, and permit me to offer a small comment. Ifwe allow the people of
the wilderness to construct of the hedge wall an escarpment to keep the faithful
pent up in the garden, we are violating the only coherent vision of the separation
of church and state. We treat the wall as an effort to limit religion, whereas its
authors understood the metaphor as a way of liberating religion. Perhaps the
people of Stratton, Ohio, do not want to hear the message of the Jehovah's
Witnesses. Perhaps I do not want to hear it, either. But we cannot wall them out.
We must either listen to what they have to tell us or say a quiet ''No, thank you,"
and close the door. Ifwe are to honor the wall ofseparation, however, the decision
to close the door must be made by individuals, not by the collective coercion of
law. This mature choice is a small price for the rest of us to pay in order to
preserve the liberty of the faithful-the only subject of the religion clause of the
First Amendment.
